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NOTES AND COMMENT

not an intentional party to any wrong on the general government. It is
the dignified and proper course to be pursued by a state to leave to the
determination of the courts the question of right between the government and the alleged wrongdoer, and conform its subsequent action to
that determination."
In consideration of this subject it is not out of place to observe that
recognized authorities have consistently maintained that a fraudulent
procurer of a conveyance may not defeat the defrauded grantor or protect himself from the consequences of his fraud by having the title conveyed to an innocent third person. Numerous authorities sustain the
foregoing principle, the leading of which are Moore v. Craweford,5 and
McDaniel v. Sprick.6
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has adjudicated that such fraud
will prevent a re-acquisition from a succeeding bona fide holder except
when such obviously fraudulent taint continues to or reattaches to the
transaction on the basis of equitable principles which obligate restitution. In Troy City Bank v. Wilcox,7 the foremost Wisconsin authority
on this principle, it is conclusively stated that a bona fide purchase of
an estate, for a valuable consideration, purges away the equity from the
estate, in the hands of all persons who may derive title under it, with
the exception of the original party, whose conscience stands bound by
the violation of his trust and meditated fraud. If such estate becomes
revested in him, the original equity will re-attach to it in his hands.
Likewise, a purchaser with notice of an outstanding equity, despite
a transfer to an innocent purchaser for value, may not on a later repurchase hold free of such equity. Of the many authorities adhering
to this doctrine, which is national in scope, the exceptionally well
reasoned case of Clark v. McNeal,8 is a valuable reference.
Thus, from the learned opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Independent
Coal and Coke Company v. United States, supra, we can deduce with
great clarity, that the obligation of restitution, having its inception in
a fraudulent transaction, persists as to every interest afterwards acquired by a tainted contract, or enjoyed as the fruit of such fraud.
The decree in this litigation was based firmly on recognized equitable
holdings, and the opinion subtly instills the doctrine that the court will
deal firmly and without equivocation with those who perpetrate fraud
upon the states and their public lands granted by the national government.
CHESTER F. KRIZEK

Insurance: Automobile liability insurance; Direct liability of
Insurer.
In Ducommun v. Strong et al," the Supreme Court of Wisconsin announced a proposition which has given rise to much apprehension among
insurance companies doing business in this state. It will also affect the
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general public, who will probably pay the bill in the form of increased
premium rates.
A policy of insurance which limits its liability to the actual loss or
damage or to the money loss sustained by the insured creates no obligation on the part of the insurer until such "actual loss" has been ascertained and the insured pays or otherwise suffers this loss. By a rider
on the policy in this case, The Interstate Exchange, party defendant,
agreed to insure Strong "against money loss by reason of his legal
liability to others." The court held that a contract which insures
against "liabilities," clearly gives rise to an obligation on the part of the
insurer, for which recovery may be had without alleging or proving that
the insured has been called upon to pay or has paid any money on
account of legal liabilities covered by the policy. And going still
further, it said that even if the contract did not purport to specifically
cover "legal liabilities," section 85.25 of the Wisconsin Statutes would
nevertheless import such provision into it and permit an injured party
or the legal representatives of a deceased to sue an insurance company
direct.
The giving of such a right is indeed a startling departure from the
procedure previously adhered to in personal injury cases. Heretofore,
a mere intimation to the jury that the defendant, in such cases, was
covered by insurance, was an undeniable ground for a mistrial. The
reason being, that the verdict of the jury, after acquiring such knowledge, would unquestionably be influenced by the almost universal antipathy of jurors toward insurance companies, resulting in verdicts disproportionate to the injury. Obviously, sympathy has no place in the
law, and it should not be fostered by retaining the insured as the only
proper party defendant; however, the cure seems to be worse than the
disease.
Section 85.25 provides: "Any bond or policy of insurance covering
liability to others by reason of the operation of a motor vehicle shall
be deemed and construed to contain the following conditions. That the
insurer shall be liable to the persons entitled to recover for the death
of any person, or for injury to the person or property, caused by the
negligent operation, maintenance, use or defective construction of the
vehicle described therein, such liability not to exceed the amount named
in said bond or policy."
This legislation, as construed by the court in this case, has the effect
of impairing the obligations of contracts in direct contravention of the
Constitution of Wisconsin and of the United States. Insurers issued
their policies under the law which would not permit their being made
parties defendant; but now the court reaches back and imparts a new
obligation in the contract of the insurer by giving a plaintiff a right to
sue the insurer direct. It is in effect retroactive legislation and contrary therefore to the holding of the court in: Hasbrouck v. City of
Milwaukee; 2 Austin v. Burgess.3
In the brief of counsel for the plaintiff it is contended that the words
of the statute, "That the insurer shall be liable," are such that it would
be hard to find more apt words with which to create a direct liability.
-13 Wis. 37.
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Such a contract is a contract for the benefit of a third party, and upon
the happening of an injury or death, the rights of all parties become4
immediately fixed. Conor Company v. Etna Indemnity Company;
Tweeddale v. Tweeddale9 The court evidently predicated its decision
on this view and construction of the statute.
Counsel for Strong and the Interstate Exchange, defendants, hold
that Section 85.25 of the Wisconsin Statutes is inconsistent with Section 204.30, which imports into an insurance contract, such as the one
here involved, certain provisions. The pertinent provisions of this section are:
i. "In case execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied
. . . . because of such insolvency or bankruptcy, then an action
may be maintained by the injured person . . .. against such

corporation under the terms of the policy, for the amount of the judgment in said action, not exceeding the amount of the policy.
2. "The indemnity provided by this policy is extended to apply in
the same manner and under the same provisions as it is applicable to
the named assured."
This statute was passed by the same legislature and was submitted
to the same committees for consideration as was Section 85.25; and
it was passed shortly after the adoption of Section 85.25. The contention is that Section 85.25 is void and of no force under the well
settled rule of statutory construction to the effect that if statutes are
inconsistent, the one which was published last must prevail. This rule
of construction is supported by ample authority: State ex rel. Carterv.
Rosenthal; Whitfield v. Davies (Wash.) ;7 State v. Holliday (Ohio
St.). 8
Numerous authorities are also cited to show that to create a direct
liability, the statute must impose it in specific language as stated in
State ex rel. Time Insurance Company v. Smith (184 Wis. 455) :
"The expression of such intention in view of its drastic and revolutionary character should be clear and definite."
The effects of this decision will be far reaching; and there is little
doubt that it will not remain long unchallenged.
Subsequent to the decision of Ducommun v. Strong,-supra, the case
of Bro v. Moran9 has been decided. By its opinion the court somewhat clarifies the situation and points the way for the solution of the
situation set out in Ducommun v. Strong. Quoting from the opinion:
"Section 85.2.5 (St. 1925) does not give the plaintiff a right of action
against the insurance company. This is a remedial statute which does
not create a liability or confer any right of action where none exists
under the terms of the policy itself. The only effect of the statute is to
permit the insurance company to be made a party defendant in those
cases where the policy creates a liability against the insurance carrier."
EVAN C. SCHWEMER
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